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ANNEXATION AND MUNICIPAL
VOTING RIGHTS
I. INTRODUCTION
As a general proposition, states have broad discretion to create, ex-
pand, contract, or even destroy their subdivisions.' A change in the
size, shape, or nature of a municipal corporation alters the relative vot-
ing strength of groups within and outside of the corporate limits.2 For
example, a city can dilute the voting strength of a minority racial or
ethnic group by annexing an all-white territory. In most cases, courts
allow the state political process to resolve the propriety of such
changes.
Courts occasionally place constitutional limitations on a state's au-
thority over the structure of its local governments where the court finds
1. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907). In Hunter, the Court
approved the consolidation of the cities of Pittsburgh and Allegheny and rejected con-
stitutional challenges based on the contract clause and the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The consolidation was without the consent of Allegheny resi-
dents. The Court held that "[t]he number, nature and duration of the powers conferred
upon these corporations and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the
absolute discretion of the State." Id. at 178; but see Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339 (1960) (state's power to redraw the borders of its municipal corporations is consti-
tutionally limited).
2. See, eg., City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462 (1987) (selective
annexation of predominantly white area held to violate the Voting Rights Act of 1965);
City of Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159 (1982) (discriminatory impact on the
black electorate through annexation without a sufficiently curative change in the electo-
ral system held to violate the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364
U.S. 339 (1960) (change in boundaries of the City of Tuskeegee so as to exclude black
voters held to violate fifteenth amendment).
3. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907); Wilkerson v. Coralville,
478 F.2d 709, 715 (8th Cir. 1973) ("Whether Coralville, in the exercise of its powers
relating to the annexation of territory, should be permitted to encircle and exclude an
impoverished area is a matter of legislative policy for the State of Iowa.").
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purposeful discrimination in the extension of the municipal franchise.4
In such cases, the party challenging the state's action bears the heavy
burden of proving both a discriminatory effect on voting rights and a
discriminatory intent on the part of the legislative body responsible for
the structure.5 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (the Act)6 in some cases
removes the plaintiff's burden of proving discriminatory intent.7 In ad-
dition, where there is a history of discriminatory voting practices, the
Act places the burden of proving a lack of discriminatory purpose and
effect on the state.8 This shift in the burden of proof creates a tension
between the constitutionally protected right to vote9 and the traditional
4. See, eg., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960). The state legislature
of Alabama redrew the boundaries of the City of Tuskeegee so as to exclude all but a
few of the city's black voters. The Court found purposeful discrimination in the state's
action and held that the rule in Hunter does not apply when a state uses its power to
infringe on a constitutionally protected right. Id. at 344-45; City of Birmingham v.
Community Fire Dist., 336 So. 2d 502 (Ala. 1976) (redrawing boundaries of land to be
annexed so as to ensure favorable election results violates Constitution).
5. See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341-42. The Court found that the city had "deprived
the petitioners of the municipal franchise, and to that end [had] incidentally changed
the city's boundaries." Id. at 347; see also G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 709
n.7 (11 th ed. 1985) (Supreme Court requires a showing of discriminatory intent to allege
a constitutional, as opposed to a statutory, violation).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1982).
7. See, eg., Velasquez v. Abilene, 725 F.2d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1984) (the 1982
amendments to the Voting Rights Act require plaintiff to show a discriminatory result
as judged by the totality of the circumstances).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1982) provides that the Director of the Census must pub-
lish a list of states which use "tests" for voting eligibility and where less than 50% of the
eligible voters vote. The Code of Federal Regulations lists the following as states and
subdivisions subject to §§ 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and certain named
parts of California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, South Dakota and Wyoming.
28 C.F.R. app. § 51 (1986).
42 U.S.C. § 1973c provides that a state or subdivision must obtain either a positive
finding by the Attorney General, or a declaratory judgment in the District Court for the
District of Columbia, that a proposed change in voting "practice or procedure does not
have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote"
before the change can take effect. See also Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526
(1973) (section 5 shifts the burden of proving lack of discriminatory intent to the state).
9. The fifteenth amendment provides:
SECTION 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color or
previous condition of servitude.
SECTION 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XV.
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values of comity and federalism.
Parts I-III of this Recent Development outline the evolution of fed-
eral review of municipal boundary changes under the Constitution and
the Voting Rights Act, culminating in the Supreme Court's recent de-
cision in City of Pleasant Grove v. United States."0 Part IV examines
the effect of Pleasant Grove and the utility of section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act as a tool to combat discriminatory practices.
II. THE TRADITIONAL RULE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
In Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh," the Supreme Court held that states
have near plenary power over the political subdivisions they create.12
In Hunter, the City of Pittsburgh wished to merge with the City of
Allegheny. 3 The merger, if approved, would have subjected Alle-
gheny residents to higher taxes.' 4 In accordance with state law, the
cities held a joint referendum.' 5 Although a majority of Allegheny res-
idents voted against the merger, a majority of the combined cities' vot-
ers approved it, so the merger took effect. 16  Former citizens of
Allegheny brought suit against Pittsburgh, alleging that the increased
tax burden violated an implied contract between the city and its resi-
dents that required Allegheny tax revenues to be spent within the
city.'7 The suit also claimed the additional taxes deprived them of
property without due process of law.' 8
The Supreme Court found for the City of Pittsburgh on both
10. 479 U.S. 462 (1987).
11. 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
12. Id. at 178-79.
13. Id. at 164-65.
14. Id. at 166. At the time, the City of Pittsburgh was planning to undertake a
number of public works projects, including electrical generation and public waterworks.
Allegheny had already supplied itself adequately with water and electricity. If the two
cities were consolidated, the residents of Allegheny would be forced to subsidize im-
provements that only benefitted Pittsburgh residents. Id. at 165-66.
15. Id. at 167. Pennsylvania law provided for the consolidation of two cities by the
annexation of the lesser into the larger "if at an election... there shall be a majority of
all the votes cast in favor of such union." Id. at 162.
16, Id. at 174-75.
17. Id. at 176-77. This claim was based on the contract clause. U.S. CONsT. art. I,
§ 10.
18. 207 U.S. at 177. The plaintiffs made 22 assignments of error, including one
claim under the fifth amendment due process clause and another under the comparable
provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. at 175. The Court addressed only the
two claims mentioned herein. Id. at 177.
1989]
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claims,19 holding in broad language that a city's actions in accord with
state law are not subject to federal constitutional attack.2" Because cit-
ies are merely convenient entities to which a state delegates authority,2"
the court reasoned, a state may constitutionally expand, contract, cre-
ate, and even destroy its municipal corporations.22 The court held that
the state political processes, not the courts, are the proper forum for
resolution of such disputes.23
In 1960, the Supreme Court first recognized a constitutional limit on
a state's power over its political subdivisions. In Gomillion v.
Lightfoot,24 the state legislature of Alabama redrew the boundaries of
the City of Tuskeegee so as to exclude most of the city's black fami-
lies.25 The legislature's action changed the shape of the city from ap-
proximately a square to an "uncouth twenty-eight sided figure.",2 6
The excluded black residents brought suit under the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment and section 2 of
the fifteenth amendment.27 The Court held that the state's action vio-
lated the fifteenth amendment by depriving black citizens of the right
to vote in Tuskeegee municipal elections.28 The Court recognized the
importance of the principles of federalism outlined in the Hunter deci-
19. Id. at 179. The Court found that there was no contract between Allegheny and
its citizens within the meaning of the Constitution, and that neither the plaintiffs nor the
city asserted a constitutionally significant property interest to give rise to a due process
claim. Id. at 180.
20. Id. at 179.
21. Id. at 178-79. "Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state,
created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the
state as may be entrusted to them." Id. at 178.
22. Id. at 178-79.
23. Id.
24. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
25. Id. at 341. The city originally had approximately 400 black voters. The
redrawn city boundaries excluded all but four or five blacks, while no white voters were
excluded. Id.
26. Id. at 340.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 346. The Court focused on the petitioners' claim that the state legisla-
ture's action deprived them of the municipal franchise in violation of the fifteenth
amendment. Id. at 347.
Justice Whittaker, in concurrence, asserted that the decisions should be based on the
equal protection clause rather than the fifteenth amendment. Id. at 349 (Whittaker, J.,
concurring). Citizens, he reasoned, do not have a right to vote in a division in which
they do not reside. They do, however, have the right not to be unlawfully segregated
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sion,29 but found that the Alabama legislature's actions were intention-
ally designed to deprive the petitioners of the municipal franchise and
its consequent rights.3" Such action, the Court held, removed the con-
troversy from the discretion of the political process and subjected it to
constitutional scrutiny.3'
The Gomillion decision stands for the proposition that generally law-
ful acts may become unlawful when done to achieve an unlawful end.32
Consequently, a plaintiff who brings a constitutional challenge of a
state action which affects voting rights must plead and prove pur-
poseful discrimination.33
Although there is no explicit constitutional right to vote at the local
level, the Supreme Court characterizes the right to vote as a fundamen-
tal political right which serves to protect all other rights.34 Under
modem equal protection analysis, 35 courts apply "strict scrutiny"
when examining legislation alleged to infringe upon a fundamental
right.36 Strict scrutiny requires that the legislation be a necessary
because of their race. Id. Cf Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (segregated
school system violates equal protection clause).
In Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978), the Court expressly held that
the equal protection clause does not confer the right to vote in municipal elections to
nonresidents even when they are subject to the municipality's police power. Id. at 64.
For a discussion of the related topic of constitutional limitations on extra-territorial
action by municipalities, see Comment, The Constitutionality of the Exercise of Extrater-
ritorial Powers by Municipalities, 45 U. Cm. L. Rv. 151 (1977).
29. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 342.
30. Id. at 347.
3 I. Id. at 346-47.
32. Id. at 347-48 (quoting Western Union Tel. Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105, 114
(1918)).
33. Id. at 339; see also City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 54 (1980) (plurality of
Court required plaintiff to show a present-day discriminatory purpose to assert violation
of fifteenth amendment).
34. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). Justice Stone in his
famous footnote 4 in Carolene Products suggested the Court employ a heightened level
of scrutiny when the challenged legislation "restricts those political processes which can
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation," Id. at 152. See
also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (strict scrutiny applied to invalidate an at-
large voting system that diluted minority voting strength).
35. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (vote dilution unconstitutionally
infringed upon the right to have one's vote counted equally).
36. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Justice Warren, writing for the Court,
said:
[Undoubtedly] the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and demo-
cratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and
1989]
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means to accomplish a compelling state end.37 Normally, application
of this standard is "strict in theory, fatal in fact."38 In the area of
voting rights, however, some laws survive judicial review even under
strict scrutiny.39
A state's interest in maintaining control over its political subdivi-
sions, as expressed in Hunter, is considered nearly absolute.4' Absent a
finding of blatant discriminatory purpose,41 the Supreme Court recog-
nizes a state's right to fashion and maintain boundaries that naturally
result in denying some groups the right to vote.42
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any al-
leged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticu-
lously scrutinized.
Id. at 561-62. See also Avery v. Midland Co., 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (extending the rule in
Reynolds to municipal elections). But cf. Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community
Action, 430 U.S. 259 (1977) (applying "mere rationality" standard to uphold New York
law that counted votes of two areas of vastly different populations equally).
37. G. GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 588; Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982).
38. G. GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 588. Gunther asserts that the modem Court
employs many different levels of scrutiny. Id. While the Court adheres to the view that
there are two or at most three levels of scrutiny, Gunther subscribes in part to Justice
Marshall's view that there is a "sliding scale" of judicial review. Id.
39. Id. at 813. Gunther suggests that the Court employs a slightly less exacting
standard than traditional strict scrutiny in voting rights cases. Id. See supra note 38.
See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978) where the Court found that
the plaintiffs, who resided outside the city limits, had no constitutionally mandated
right to vote in Tuscaloosa municipal elections. The Court also held that extension of
municipal police power beyond corporate limits without the concomitant right to vote
was a permissible exercise of state powers. Id. at 72-75.
40. See supra notes 1, 12-23 and accompanying text. See also State ex rel. Vicars v.
Kingsport, 659 S.W.2d 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (boundary-drawing so as to ensure
favorable referendum result held to be constitutional if done within statutory power).
41. See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
42. See Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978) (upholding state's right
to extend municipal police power beyond a city's corporate limits without also ex-
tending the right to vote); see also City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plaintiff
required to show a present-day discriminatory purpose to allege a fifteenth amendment
violation).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol35/iss1/12
ANNEXATION
III. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 196543
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 196544 requires some states to
"pre-clear" changes in voting practices or procedures with either the
Attorney General of the United States or the Federal District Court for
the District of Columbia.4" To obtain preclearance, a state must show
its proposed change is not discriminatory in purpose or effect.4 6
In Perkins v. Mathews,4 7 the Supreme Court held that the language
of section 5 reaches changes in municipal boundaries effected by annex-
ation.4 ' The Court in Perkins read congressional intent broadly, hold-
ing that changes in a city's boundaries should be considered changes in
"voting practices or procedures.",4 9
In Richmond v. United States,5" the Court first applied the Act's
"purpose or effect" standard to a city's attempt to annex territory.5 1
Pursuant to the Act, the city sought approval of its annexation of a
predominantly white area.52 The United States Attorney General ini-
tially withheld approval.53 After agreeing to change its electoral sys-
tem from a multimember at-large council system to a single-member
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1982). This paper addresses municipal voting rights affected
by changes in municipal boundaries. Only § 5 of the Act is interpreted to reach these
kinds of changes. Of related interest is the "totality of circumstances" test incorporated
in § 2 in the 1982 amendments. Section 2 allows courts to consider discriminatory
effect. See Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectives on the
Purpose vs. Results Approach from the Voting Rights Act, 69 VA. L. REv. 633 (1983).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982). The Supreme Court held § 5 to be a constitutional
exercise of Congress' remedial powers under the fifteenth amendment in South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334-35 (1966).
45, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982).
46. Id. See supra notes 8-9. 28 C.F.R. § 51.29 (1987) provides that a state or subdi-
vision seeking preclearance bears the burden of proving that its changes are not discrim-
inatory in purpose or effect.
47. 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
48. Id. at 388-90.
49. Id. at 387.
50. 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
51, See Comment, Supreme Court Expands Judicial Discretion in Section Five Cases,
17 SUFF. U. L. REv. 1085 (1983) (Court applied purpose and effect standard to annexa-
tion for the first time).
52. 422 U.S. at 363. The annexation resulted in a drop in the black population
percentage from about 52% to about 42%. Id.
53. Id. at 363-64. At the time of the election, the city had a nine-member city
council. Id. at 363. All members were elected at large. Id. The Attorney General
denied preclearance because he found that the annexation diluted the voting strength of
the black community. Id. at 364.
1989]
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ward system,54 the city sued in the District Court for the District of
Columbia for a declaratory judgment that the annexation did not have
a discriminatory purpose or effect." The district court found that the
city had undertaken the annexation with a discriminatory purpose and
that the change in the voting system did not cure the discriminatory
impact to the greatest extent possible. 6 However, the district court
declined to order the city to relinquish the annexed territory and
delayed fashioning any remedy until the resolution of a pending com-
panion suit.57
On direct appeal the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Act
only required fair representation to the black community in the new,
enlarged community. 8 The Court found that the proposed electoral
system was the result of good faith negotiation with the Attorney Gen-
eral and was sufficient to "cure" any racially discriminatory effect
caused by the annexation of a predominantly white area. 9
A similar situation arose in City of Port Arthur v. United States.6'
The City of Port Arthur consolidated with two adjoining cities and
annexed an unincorporated area, resulting in a reduction in the per-
centage of blhcks in the city from 45.21 percent to 40.56 percent.6 '
Before the change, a mayor and a six-member city council governed
the city.62 All of the council members were elected at-large. 3 The city
54. Id. at 366. The new plan proposed four predominantly black wards, four
predominantly white wards, and one "swing" ward which was 40.9% black. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 367.
57. Id. The companion case, Holt II, was filed in the Eastern District of Virginia
and sought to invalidate the annexation under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 365.
58. Id. at 371-72. The Court saw the United States' position as either prohibiting
annexations altogether, or requiring that the black community is afforded the same vot-
ing strength in the new community as it enjoyed in the old. Id.
59. Id. at 378. The Court remanded the case to the district court for a determina-
tion of whether the city had acted with a discriminatory purpose. Id. Justice Brennan,
dissenting, asserted that Richmond had not carried its burden of proving that the
change was free of any racially discriminatory purpose. Id. at 379 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). He cited the district court's expertise and its finding that "Richmond's primary, if
not sole purpose in annexing the territory" was to discriminate against the black com-
munity. Therefore he asserted a remand was unnecessary. Id. at 381-82 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
60. 459 U.S. 159 (1982).
61. Id. at 162. The black voting population constituted about 35% of the total
population. Id.
62. Id.
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proposed a number of revised election plans to the district court in an
action for preclearance under section 5.6' The final plan provided that
four representatives would be elected from four single-member dis-
tricts, two would be elected from larger combined districts, and three
representatives, plus the mayor, would be elected at large with a major-
ity vote requirement. 65 The district court found that the plan, assum-
ing racial bloc voting, ensured that blacks could elect only three of the
nine representatives. 66 Although the district court found no discrimi-
natory purpose, it denied preclearance, finding that the plan failed to
neutralize the discriminatory impact of the city's expansion.6 7
The Supreme Court affirmed. 68  The Court adhered to the Rich-
mond Court's holding that an electoral system must fairly represent
blacks in the newly enlarged community.6 9  Unlike the Richmond
Court, however, the Port Arthur Court deferred to the district court's
findings.7" The Court held that Port Arthur had failed to provide for
fair representation of minority interests.71 The Court did not explain
why it chose to defer to the district court's findings of discriminatory
effect in Port Arthur and not in Richmond.72
63. Id. Each council member had to reside in a specified district, but the entire city
voted on each member. Id.
64. Id. at 162-63. The city first proposed adding two seats to the existing system
with residency requirements in the newly annexed territory. Id. at 162. It also submit-
ted a plan whereby four members would be elected from single member districts, four
more would be elected at large with residency requirements, and a mayor would be
elected with no residency requirement. Id. at 163.
65. Id. at 164. The plan provided that if no candidate received a majority of the
vote, the top two finishers would participate in a runoff election. Id.
66. Id. Two of the four proposed wards were predominantly black; together they
comprised one of the larger combined districts, also predominantly black. Id. White
majorities would have voted in the races for the rest of the seats (two wards, one com-
bined district, and three at-large seats). Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 168.
69. Id. at 166.
70. Id. at 167.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 167. Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court in Richmond, Port
Arthur, and Pleasant Grove. Although the language of Port Arthur implies that the
Court adopted Justice Brennan's dissent from Richmond, supra note 59, the Court may
have merely found the facts in Port Arthur most favorable to the United States. See
Comment, supra note 51, at 1091. Justice Powell found the cases irreconcilable. 459
U.S. at 169 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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In Pleasant Grove v. United States,73 the Court extended the Rich-
mond and Port Arthur rulings by allowing the district court to consider
the potential effects of boundary changes as evidence of an impermissi-
ble purpose.74 In Pleasant Grove, an all-white city sought to annex two
parcels.7" No blacks resided in either area.76 A third adjacent area,
the Highlands, which was predominantly black, petitioned the city for
annexation,7 7 but the city denied this request.78 The city sought
preclearance in the district court for the two annexations.79 The dis-
trict court found that the annexation was designed to perpetuate "an
all-white enclave in an otherwise racially mixed section of Alabama."8
Two major factors led the district court to deny preclearance: first,
the city's failure to annex the Highlands was evidence of discrimina-
tory purpose;81 second, the court found that the city intended to use
the annexed territory for white residential development. 82
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the city argued that even if its
failure to annex the Highlands was racially motivated, the decision was
not a change with respect to voting and was therefore not subject to
section 5.83 The city also argued that since it had no black population
either before or after the annexation, it had not infringed upon minor-
ity voting rights.84 The Court agreed with the first argument in theory,
but held that the district court had not exceeded its authority when it
considered the city's failure to annex the Highlands as evidence of dis-
criminatory intent with respect to the decision to annex the all-white
parcels.8 5 The Court rejected the city's second argument, holding that
73. 479 U.S. 462 (1987).
74. Id. at 471.
75. Id. at 464.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 466.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 468 F.Supp. 1455, 1455-56 (D. D.C.
1986).
81. 479 U.S. at 467.
82. Id. at 466.
83. Id. at 470. The city asserted initially that its decision was motivated by eco-
nomic considerations. The Court pointed out, however, that in its cost-benefit analysis,
the city had included the cost of services that it already provided to the Highlands and
had failed to include significant potential tax benefits. Id.
84. Id. at 471-72.
85. Id. at 472.
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the impermissible "purpose" prohibited by the Act can relate to future
as well as present conditions.86
In dissent, Justice Powell found no discriminatory voting-related
purpose in the proposed annexations.87 He interpreted the language of
the Act to apply only to present effects on black voting rights and
called the majority's finding of discriminatory purpose "speculative." 8 8
Powell claimed the Court improperly considered Pleasant Grove's fail-
ure to annex the Highlands as evidence of intent to deny voting
rights.89 Unless there was a showing of retrogression of black voting
rights, Justice Powell would find no section 5 violation.'
IV. CONCLUSION
Clearly, the Pleasant Grove Court did not establish a new principle
of constitutional law.91 The purpose-and-effect standard necessary to
make out a constitutional violation remains intact.92 Nor did the
Court depart radically from precedent in its interpretation of the Vot-
ing Rights Act. Pleasant Grove does represent the Court's first attempt
to define the kind of evidence that plaintiffs may use to show a discrim-
inatory purpose under section 5.93 Discretion remains with the district
86. Id. Pleasant Grove strongly suggests that the Court has adopted Justice Bren-
nan's dissent in Richmond. See supra note 59. Justice Powell again dissented, sug-
gesting that while there was, in his view, no Voting Rights Act violation, he might have
been inclined to find a constitutional violation. Id. at 479 (Powell, J., dissenting).
87. 479 U.S. at 475 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell, joined by Justices Rehn-
quist and O'Connor, accepted the city's argument that since no blacks resided in Pleas-
ant Grove or in the proposed additions, "the city could not have acted with the purpose
to dilute the voting rights of black municipal voters." Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 476 (Powell, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 478-79 (Powell, J., dissenting). "Although we have stated [in Perkins v.
Mathews] that § 5 reaches changes with the 'potential for racial discrimination in vot-
ing,' . . . the 'potential' refers to present and concrete effects, not effects based on specu-
lation as to what might happen at some time in the future." Id. at 476 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
90. Id. at 476-77 (Powell, J., dissenting).
91. The case is based on the preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act, not
the fifteenth amendment or the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Congress has the power, pursuant to § 2 of the fifteenth amendment, to address discrim-
ination in voting practices. For this purpose, legislation may be remedial in nature and
may intrude into areas traditionally reserved to the states. South Carolina v. Katzen-
bach, 383 U.S. 301, 325-27 (1966).
92. See supra notes 24-42 and accompanying text.
93. The Court held that the district court properly took into account the city's fail-
ure to annex the Highlands. 479 U.S. at 472.
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court94  to examine the motives of a municipality seeking
preclearance. 9'
One commentator suggests that the net effect of the Pleasant Grove
decision has been to deny a handful of citizens the right to vote in
Pleasant Grove city elections. 96 This denial, he and Justice Powell ar-
gue, is contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Act.97 He ignores,
however, the remedial nature of section 5.98 Section 5 is a constitu-
tional exercise of congressional power to remedy the effects of histori-
cal discrimination.99 The Court's decision to forbid the perpetuation
and expansion of an "all-white enclave" is both within the constitu-
tional reach of, and consistent with, the spirit of the fifteenth
amendment. io
The facts of Pleasant Grove demonstrate that section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act has yet to outlive its usefulness.' ' Section 5 is far from an
all-encompassing tool with which the Attorney General can eliminate
discrimination at its roots.1"2 Under the Pleasant Grove standard,
however, section 5 ensures that when municipalities change their
boundaries, they must do so in good faith.
Brett W. Berri *
94. Strictly speaking, the Court held only that the district court's findings were not
clearly erroneous. Id.
95. Id.
96. Comment, The 1965 Voting Rights Act: Annexation and Racial Discrimination,
10 HARV. J. L. & PUB. PoL'Y 786 (1987).
97. Id
98. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966).
99. Id. at 327-28.
100. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566-67 (1969) (legislature
intended § 5 to be given "broadest scope possible").
101. See supra note 8. As late as 1986 no fewer than 22 states or subdivisions had
employed tests for voter eligibility within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982).
In effect, Pleasant Grove has succeeded in perpetuating itself as an all-white city. The
remedy approved by the Supreme Court in Pleasant Grove merely checks the city's
growth as a "monolithic white voting block." 479 U.S. at 472.
102. See supra note 8. Section 5 does not apply to a majority of the states.
* J.D. 1988, Washington University
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